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Washington Still Undecided on China Policy

WASHINGTON—The arrival in Chungking of Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, on November 25, two days after Chinese Communist officials liberated Angus Ward, American Consul General in Mukden, from incarceration underlined the problem confronting the Administration in forming its policy toward Chinese affairs. In considering whether to recognize the Communist government at Peiping, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has to weigh not only the realities of the situation in China but also the influence of Senators and Representatives who continue to recommend that the United States help the Chinese Nationalist government. Among them Mr. Knowland is a leader. His views are shared by perhaps twenty-five members of the Senate and most of the Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The latter group, led by Representative Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, advocated the ouster of Secretary of State Acheson on November 24, the day after Consul General Ward's liberation, on the ground that he had been guilty of "incredible bungling" in dealing with the Ward affair.

While the accusation cannot injure Mr. Acheson's position in the Administration, it does highlight the possibility that Republican members of Congress will seize upon China as their principal issue in foreign policy and use it to harass the Administration on other international problems. It is possible that, should the Chinese Communists be recognized before next summer, Mr. Acheson might lose valuable Congressional support for the renewal of

the European Recovery Program, American membership in the International Trade Organization, the program for aid to underdeveloped countries and other foreign policy legislation which the President will probably request Congress to approve in the coming session.

Cautious Policy

The possibility that China might become a domestic political issue is in itself almost sufficient to make the Administration cautious in dealing with the onward march of the Communist armies in China. Senator Knowland's sympathetic consultation in Chungking with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek indicated the views of the members of Congress who differ with the Administration on China policy. Previously, in a statement in Formosa, he had said that it was not too late for the Nationalist government to recapture control of all China, even though the Communists hold Manchuria, most of north-west China, Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, and their second field army is proceeding without difficulty toward Chungking itself. The grave reverses suffered by General Washington during the Revolutionary War did not keep him from ultimate victory, Mr. Knowland recalled in Formosa.

The prestige of the associates of Senator Knowland on the China issue is enhanced by the support they occasionally receive from Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who is said to have recovered from his recent operation and to be ready

to take his place at the Capitol in January.

The present cautious Administration policy toward China saves Mr. Acheson from open conflict with the dissident members of Congress and with either of the two great factions in China. It also saves the United States from the dilemma of backing a Communist government for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, since official recognition of the Peiping regime would mean admission of its right to the seat now occupied by Dr. T. F. Tsiang, representative of the Nationalist government. A seat for the Peiping government at Lake Success might end the isolation of the Soviet Union among the permanent members of the Security Council and revive American interest in the retention of the veto, to save the United States from being outvoted on issues concerning which the West itself might be divided. The Administration therefore has taken no formal notice of the messages which Chou En-lai, Prime Minister in the People's Republic proclaimed on October 1, sent on November 15 to Trygve Lie, UN Secretary General, and Carlos P. Romulo, President of the UN General Assembly, stating that the "People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing all the people of the People's Republic, . . . the Kuomintang government is no longer qualified to represent the Chinese people, . . . the delegation under Tsiang Ting-fu sent by the so-called 'Chinese National government' has no right to speak for the Chinese people in the United Nations organization."

At the same time, the determination

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not to become embroiled at home or abroad in controversy over China induced the Administration to make only vague comments when Dr. Tsiang on November 25, amplifying charges he had submitted earlier in the autumn, accused the Soviet Union before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of responsibility for the "present danger" in China. Dr. Tsiang declared that Soviet authorities in Manchuria had "deliberately afforded the maximum and unfettered opportunities for the growth and expansion of Chinese Communist forces" and otherwise had "actively supported the Chinese Communists militarily, economically and morally." Whereas suspicion of approximately similar Soviet activities in northern Greece led almost three years ago to the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the inauguration of the political struggle in Europe for the containment of Russia, Dr. Tsiang's protest has left the Administration unruffled.

This was indicated on November 28, when Dr. Philip C. Jessup, United States representative, introduced a counter-proposal in the Political and Security Committee which would merely call on all nations to respect the independence of China and to respect the right of the Chinese people now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control.

In the case of Consul General Ward, too, Secretary Acheson avoided serious colli-

sion with the Senators or the Communists by pointing out the damage the arrest inflicted on "basic concepts of international law" and by exerting pressure on the Communists, not through threats or bravado, but by requesting thirty UN members (including the Soviet Union) to express their concern to Peiping over the arrest. Had the Administration adopted a sterner approach to Peiping, a conflict might have followed which could have distracted the Administration from the focal points of its foreign policy interests, Europe and the Middle East.

Pressures for Recognition

The possibility of avoiding the issue of recognizing the People's Republic for a period longer than six months seems unlikely, unless Senator Knowland's faith in the ability of the Nationalist government to recapture the initiative is borne out by events. Other nations which support the United States against the Soviet Union are now actively studying the issue. British, Australian and New Zealand officials in a conference on Southeast Asia at Canberra on November 10 took up the China problem with a view to more serious discussion in January. The British government indicated to Parliament on October 19 that it deferred to the United States on China policy. Britain has been sending its ships to Communist ports through the Nationalist blockade under protection of war vessels and has demanded that China remove its warships from

waters near Hong Kong. At the same time the Chinese Communist radio has criticized the British for allegedly driving 40,000 Chinese from Malaya, where colonial troops are engaged in guerrilla action against Communist forces.

In some respects the China problem today is similar to the China problem of 1899, when Secretary of State John Hay enunciated the Open Door doctrine designed to safeguard equality of commercial access to China when Russia was threatening to monopolize the Chinese trade. Non-recognition might gain for Russia now what it failed to obtain fifty years ago. The desire to encourage Japan's stability gives the United States a special interest in keeping the China trade open. Hietaro Inagaki, Japanese Minister of Trade and Industry, said on November 24 that Japan expects Communist China to account for one-fourth of its foreign commerce. Japan's inability to develop export outlets on the Asian continent would prolong its dependence on American subsidies.

The various pressures for recognition, however, do not signify that immediate action is likely. Acknowledging Congressional interest in a problem which constitutionally lies wholly in the province of the President's foreign policy powers, Secretary Acheson has declared that he will not recognize the People's Republic without consulting members of the Senate and House.

BLAIR BOLLES

Accord on Germany Reflects Uneasy Compromises

The announcement on November 24 of the terms of an agreement between the Western Allied High Commissioners for Germany and Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the West German Federal Republic at Bonn, marks the completion of a series of events designed to tip the scales of the East-West competition for German allegiance in favor of the Western powers. The balance appeared weighted on the side of the West in September with the creation of the Bonn republic and on that of the East in October with the establishment of an East German Democratic Republic in the Russian zone of occupation. Now the swing is westward again as the result of decisions reached by the Paris meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers on November 9-10, the visit of Secretary of State Acheson to Bonn and Berlin immediately thereafter

and particularly the increased stature accorded the West German government through participation on an approximately equal basis in the negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners.

Terms of Accord

The Western concessions appear to be a compromise between French fears of Germany and American fears of the U.S.S.R. as well as the growing desire of Congress to relieve United States taxpayers of the billion-dollar-a-year German burden. The agreement stipulates the gradual re-establishment of German consular and commercial relations with other countries where such relations "appear advantageous"; relaxation of restrictions on German shipbuilding to the extent of allowing construction of certain types and numbers of ships, especially ocean-going

vessels (except passenger ships) with the approval of the High Commission; promotion of West German participation in international organizations "where German experience and support can contribute to the general welfare," including the Council of Europe; and cessation of dismantling of all plants in stricken Berlin and of certain steel, synthetic rubber and oil production plants of great importance, such as the August Thyssen works which alone accounted for 10 per cent of German pre-war steel capacity.

This bitterly fought concession represented one more step by Britain and France in yielding to United States pressure for the reduction of the German dismantling program. It is possible that German adherence to the International Ruhr Authority was purchased at the price of the decreases in dismantling. The agree-

ment precludes any modifications in the existing prohibitions and limitations on production of other materials or in the present ceiling on steel production of 10.7 million tons a year, although the Germans had strenuously argued for 16 million tons.

The Bonn republic in turn pledges full cooperation with the Military Security Board established in December 1948 to carry on inspections to prevent the resurgence of German military power. The Republic also agrees to maintain demilitarization within its borders and to endeavor "by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed forces of any kind"; to eradicate Nazism from German life and institutions and to prevent the revival of totalitarianism in any form. Thus far the German part of the accord merely reiterates generalizations agreed to previously and now again expressed as pious hopes. The agreement to seek legislative action in regard to decartelization corresponding to decisions of the High Commission and to join the International Authority for control of the Ruhr are the crux of the German concessions. Until this time the Germans have steadily refused to admit the validity of the international agency established almost a year ago primarily to divide coal, coke and steel from the great Ruhr industrial production area between German consumption and export.

Gains for West?

Neither the Western powers nor the Germans are happy about the concessions each made to secure the agreement as a basis for relations between the Germans and the Western occupying powers. Many observers feel that what appear to be Western gains in the struggle for Germany against the U.S.S.R. are actually gains only for the Germans who play the East and West off against each other. These observers believe that the chief beneficiaries are the Germans most closely allied with the owner-managers of big industry in Western Germany who have won another round in their struggle against dismantling. In the West, especially in France, fears of a resurgent Germany are not allayed by the concessions made in the agreement. After an all-night debate on German policy, the French National Assembly accepted the agreement with considerable reluctance on November 26 by a vote of 334 to 248.

The same day, also after a turbulent all-night session, Dr. Adenauer secured sup-

port for the agreement in the lower house of the West German parliament, the *Bundestag*. During the debate, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the Social Democratic leader who called Dr. Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies" and denounced the agreement as a sell-out to the Western powers, was expelled for twenty sessions. This action may indicate how readily the Germans revert to authoritarianism the moment they are faced with opposition. On the other hand, the violent nationalism of Dr. Schumacher makes him less welcome than before even to those who have been sympathetic to the Social Democrats and who had hoped the United States would prove more friendly to that party.

German Rearmament

Although the agreement re-emphasizes the present intention of the Western powers to prevent the rebuilding of a German army in any form, reports are becoming more numerous that high-ranking United States military and other officials favor rearmament of Western Germany as a first line of defense in the event of war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Reports from the East that the present armed East German People's police will be strengthened to a total of 360,000 and shifted to army status under Russian General Ivan S. Konev and that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Germany have added weight to the arguments of those who hold this view.

Thus General Lucius D. Clay, former United States Military Governor of Germany said in Boston on November 21 that he favored a composite military force of Western European nations, including Germany, as a means of strengthening Western Europe. Senator Elmer Thomas, Democrat of Oklahoma, has stated that, while refusing authorization to Germany to manufacture arms, he would approve the formation of several divisions of German troops armed by the United States. Those and other reports have been extensively aired in the Russian press as definite indications of United States intentions, although both President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, as well as Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in Frankfort on November 27, have explicitly denied any intention on the part of this country to rearm Germany.

Public opinion in the United States seems to agree at present with the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee whose members, with

the exception of Senator Thomas, on completion of a five-week investigation of economic and military integration in Western Europe, on November 27 reported firm opposition to German rearmament. French opposition is so strong that Pierre-Henri Tietgen, as cabinet spokesman, has indicated France could not continue in any organization in which a rearmed Western Germany might be allowed to participate.

Nor are the Germans themselves more enthusiastic. Not only have individual *Bundestag* members shown a lack of enthusiasm because of their expressed fears of the influence of army officials on the German political situation but the people themselves shy away from the idea. Over 60 per cent of the people canvassed in a recent poll in the West have come out against military service, presumably because their recent bitter experience makes them prefer to have British, French and American troops involved in a possible East-West conflict rather than themselves.

Various observers, including Matthew Woll, Vice President of the AFL, have already expressed concern over Dr. Adenauer's dangerous association with the German heavy industry of the Ruhr and the apparent trend toward control of the German economy by pre-war leaders of German industry. It is more than possible that the new agreement may accentuate that trend, for the slow-down of dismantling has played into their hands. In an increasingly nationalistic Germany, adherence to the International Ruhr Authority may presage the development of extreme chauvinism, pulling the ultra-conservative Adenauer regime still further to the right, or ultimately overthrowing it.

As the *New York Times* points out on November 27, from a short-term view, the West is strengthening West Germany for peace by fostering a higher standard of living economically, but in the long run the question is whether the Germany shaping up in the East as well as the West can or will be a threat or a power for peace. The ultimate task is to make the West German state so strong ideologically that it will influence the East Germans to join it in the reunion of the two Germanies which is inevitable in the long run.

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FPA Bookshelf

The Department of State, a History of Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel, by Graham S. Stuart. New York, Macmillan, 1949. \$7.50

Mr. Stuart, who is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and author of *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, has written a comprehensive and readable account of the State Department from its origins to the present day, including a characterization of each Secretary of State and an analysis of the evolving structure of the Department in the light of the principal current issues in foreign policy and diplomatic practice.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1947, edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert R. Turner. Vol. IX. Princeton, published for the World Peace Foundation by Princeton University Press, 1949. \$6.00

The latest volume in this distinguished series covers, for the first time, a single calendar year. The chapters on termination of the war and policy toward former enemy states have been replaced by a chapter on occupation policy, while a new chapter on economic reconstruction and development highlights a major trend in American foreign policy.

We of the Americas, by Carlos Dávila, New York, Ziff-Davis, 1949. \$3.50

A polemic against the "regionalism in reverse", which has led the United States to turn its back on the economic potential of the Western Hemisphere in an attempt to align itself with the economies of Western Europe. Many readers will describe Mr. Dávila's proposal for the economic integration of the hemisphere as basically isolationist. Nevertheless, his book performs a highly important and necessary service; first, in marshaling arguments to refute the "legends" which have blackened Latin America as a market and investment outlet and, secondly, in warning the peoples of the Americas of the consequences that may follow from development of the raw material resources of "Eurafrica" and "Eurasia" unless such programs are integrated into a larger scheme.

Sweden, Model for a World, by Hudson Strode. New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1949. \$5.00

A brightly enthusiastic report by an interpreter of various foreign lands which ranges from historical sketches to travel impressions, from interviews with noted Swedish personalities to analysis of cooperatives and the national temperament.

The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security, by Laurence Duggan. New York, Henry Holt, 1949. \$3.00

This analysis of hemisphere relations is more than merely an invaluable document of the period in which the late Laurence Duggan was intimately associated with the Department of State at the policy-making level. It is also a frank but sober statement of the unsolved problems which confront the American Republics in realizing aspirations to a "fuller life" for their peoples and security against war. Mr. Duggan's last service to the cause of inter-American cooperation that absorbed him bears the stamp of discriminating intelligence which distinguished all his work. After leaving the State Department Mr. Duggan served for a time as member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association.

Turmoil in Latin America

While our attention has been focused on Russia and China, a series of military coups establishing right-wing dictatorships has been sweeping our neighbors to the south. What are the reasons for these coups? What do they spell for the security of the Western Hemisphere? READ:

ARMY CHALLENGE IN LATIN AMERICA

by

Olive Holmes

December 1 issue

Foreign Policy Reports—25c.

Subscription \$5; to FPA members, \$4.

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BUFFALO, December 3, *Can the U.S. Unite Western Europe?*, Blair Bolles

*SPRINGFIELD, December 3, *How Britain Stands Today*, Captain Arthur Marsden, Terence McCarthy

*ELMIRA, December 6, *The Position of England on the International Scene*, Wilson H. Coates

*NEW YORK, December 6, *Germany's Future*, Hans Simons

WORCESTER, December 7, *Report from the Far East*, Brooks Emeny, William Hung

OKLAHOMA CITY, December 8, *Reconstruction in the Orient*, Ann Guthrie

PHILADELPHIA, December 8, *Germany—Key to European Stability*, Lt. Gen. Lucius Clay

PROVIDENCE, December 8, *The World Over*, Brooks Emeny

SHREVEPORT, December 8, *Inter-American Policy*, Willard Barber

ROCHESTER, December 10, *World Affairs Institute*, Louis Dolivet, The Honorable Warren R. Austin

*CLEVELAND, December 13, *Western Europe and Economic Union*, Paul Hoffman

LYNN, December 15, *What I Saw in Europe*, William Henry Chamberlain

BETHLEHEM, December 16, *Report from Germany*, Francis E. Walter

CINCINNATI, December 16, *Can Tito Survive?*, Philip E. Mosely

*Data taken from printed announcement.

News in the Making

LABOR SELF-RESTRAINT: On the eve of the conference of the new democratic labor International which opened in London on November 28, the labor unions of Britain and France displayed a sense of responsibility that brought favorable comments from non-labor circles. The British Trades Union Congress, following an eight-week study of the effects of devaluation, urged its 8 million members to hold the line on wages for a year except for the lowest-paid categories, who have been promised increases by the government. The one-day strike staged by French workers, both in Communist and Socialist unions, on November 25 went off without incidents and without disruption of France's economic life. However, the French Catholic monthly *Esprit*, pointing out the economic difficulties faced by workers and the indifference thus far displayed by the government and the employers, states that France's internal situation "needs no foreign intervention" to become grave this winter.

CONSTITUTION FOR INDIA: The Indian Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution on November 26 which will transform the country into a "sovereign democratic republic," with a President as legal chief of state and a Prime Minister exercising the main executive powers. This document, the world's longest constitution, goes into effect January 26, but the first general elections will not take place until next winter.

THE NEW JERUSALEM: Despite efforts in the General Assembly to internationalize Jerusalem, it now appears that the city will remain divided, as at present, between Israel and Jordan. Both Israel, which controls the New City with its Jewish population, and Jordan, which holds the Old City and its Holy Places, on November 25 and 26 rejected UN proposals for internationalization. Unless the Western powers, the Latin American countries and the Arab states which favor an international regime achieve a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and take a firm stand, the *de facto* division of the city will continue.

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